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A B S T R A C T   
The acknowledgement of uncertainty and complexity in social-ecological systems has increased the im-
plementation of collaborative governance regimes for environmental issues. The performance of these new re-
gimes to deliver favourable social and ecological outcomes must therefore be evaluated. We focus on the case of 
Swedish wildlife governance, which has a tradition of using collaborative elements. In relation to moose (Alces 
alces), these collaborative aspects were recently formalized in an amended policy. We aim to assess some aspects 
of this new regime’s performance with respect to intermediate ecological outcomes (i.e. quota fulfilment). We 
use path analysis to test the causal effects of system context and collaboration dynamics on governance out-
comes. Collaboration dynamics were assessed using a web-based survey sent to all stakeholders in Moose 
Management Groups (response rate = 82 %). Our originally specified model yielded a good fit (SRMR of .030 and 
robust TLI of .996) and explained 20 % of the variation in outcomes. Context variables revealed significant direct 
effects on collaboration dynamics and outcomes. Larger Moose Management Areas and fluctuations in forage 
availability required more time investment from actors, while high land use diversity and density of other 
ungulate species negatively affected moose quota fulfilment. Moose Management Groups that invested more time 
and perceived to have a good knowledge base achieved better quota fulfilment. Collaboration dynamics thus had 
a positive direct effect on outcomes. From a policy perspective, our results raise questions regarding institutional 
fit because context factors had significant negative effects on collaboration dynamics and the outcomes of the 
collaborative process.   
1. Introduction 
In recent decades, collaborative forms of governance have become 
increasingly popular for addressing environmental issues (Armitage and 
Plummer, 2010; Bodin, 2017; Jager et al., 2019). This grew out of a 
general trend towards more collaborative governance regimes across all 
public policy domains (Newig and Fritsch, 2009), and the awareness 
that natural resources are components of complex social-ecological 
systems (SES) often associated with conflicts (Guerrero et al., 2015;  
Ostrom, 2009). One well-established framework for analysing these 
complex SES is Elinor Ostrom’s social-ecological system framework 
(SESF; McGinnis and Ostrom, 2014; Ostrom, 2007), which shows how 
collective action and its outcomes are embedded into a complex context 
influenced by the governance system, actors, resource systems, and 
resource units (Ostrom, 2011). System analyses highlighted the com-
plexity of SES, including change occurring at various spatial and tem-
poral scales, which creates uncertainty and challenges for sustainable 
resource use (Armitage and Plummer, 2010; Berkes, 2017). There can 
be different types of uncertainties relating to environmental variation, 
monitoring, implementation and processes or structures (Milner- 
Gulland and Shea, 2017; Moa et al., 2017). To handle uncertainties and 
conflicts inherent to SES, more collaborative forms of governance are 
prescribed. They aim to include local knowledge, decentralize decision- 
making, create institutions that match ecological dynamics, and in-
crease the adaptive capacity of the governance regime (Armitage and 
Plummer, 2010; Emerson and Gerlak, 2014). These collaborative gov-
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ernance regimes often operationalize adaptive management as a tool 
for systematic knowledge generation during the management process 
(Armitage et al., 2011; Berkes, 2017)1 . Adaptive management that 
incorporates collaborative aspects has been termed adaptive co-man-
agement (Plummer, 2009). 
The introduction of these collaborative governance and manage-
ment approaches for environmental issues has been examined from 
diverse scientific perspectives (Ansell and Gash, 2008). Some research 
in this area has its origins in natural resource issues, as exemplified by 
the adaptive co-management literature (Plummer et al., 2012), whereas 
collaborative governance literature draws on existing frameworks and 
theories from broader fields such as public administration (see Ansell 
and Gash, 2008 or Emerson et al., 2011 for a detailed description). 
Reviews of collaborative governance and adaptive co-management case 
studies have presented implementation examples spanning a wide 
range of natural resources including forests, protected areas, wetlands, 
fisheries, and wildlife (Emerson et al., 2011; Plummer et al., 2017). 
However, examples relating to wildlife have mainly concerned aquatic 
creatures or species of conservation concern (Clement et al., 2019;  
Plummer et al., 2012; Redpath et al., 2017). There seems to be a lack of 
studies on collaborative governance and management of terrestrial 
wildlife such as ungulates that are managed for sustainable use, espe-
cially in a European context. 
Independent of disciplinary roots and targeted resources, much of 
the existing research has focused on favourable preconditions for the 
implementation of collaborative governance regimes and the evalua-
tion of their effectiveness (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015b; Scott, 2015). 
More specifically, studies have sought to determine whether including 
collaborative aspects has led to improved social and ecological out-
comes and thus greater sustainability. The focus of individual analyses 
in these studies has ranged from the local to the international level 
(Young, 2018). Existing evaluations have yielded varied but promising 
results, with collaborative forms of governance potentially improving 
conflict management while increasing social capital and the effective-
ness of collective actions (Ansell and Gash, 2008; Emerson and 
Nabatchi, 2015b; Scott, 2015). 
Previous studies have also highlighted the limitations and chal-
lenges of such evaluations and some remaining knowledge gaps 
(Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015b; Jager et al., 2019), such as a tendency 
to focus more on input and process aspects instead of outcome and 
impact measures and to treat social and ecological variables separately 
(Koontz et al., 2019; Thomas and Koontz, 2011). The implementation of 
collaborative governance regimes is often driven by complexity, inter-
dependence, and uncertainties (Emerson et al., 2011). However, these 
drivers also make it difficult to monitor the right indicators over suf-
ficient time periods and to account for complex interdependencies in 
order to obtain valid data for evaluation (Koontz and Thomas, 2006). 
Therefore, solid empirical evidence on the implications of specific 
ecosystem characteristics for the outcomes of collaborative governance 
regimes remains scarce (Bodin, 2017). 
Here we aim to address these knowledge gaps using empirical evi-
dence on Swedish wildlife governance. Our study examines a colla-
borative governance regime for moose whose implementation created a 
quasi-experimental set up of 149 cases across varied social-ecological 
contexts. Drawing on systematic ecological monitoring data and survey 
data on how the involved actors perceive the quality of the collabora-
tion dynamics allows us to test a detailed theoretical model of colla-
borative governance. The cross-site study design enables us to evaluate 
the direct and indirect effects of the system context on collaboration 
dynamics and outcomes. Our study also contributes to the sparse lit-
erature on the implications of collaborative governance for sustainable 
use of terrestrial wildlife. 
1.1. Swedish wildlife governance 
Collaborative aspects and a focus on learning have a rather long 
tradition in Swedish wildlife governance. Moose, as the iconic species of 
the country, has partly driven the development of the wildlife man-
agement system (Danell et al., 2016). Starting from a total ban on all 
moose hunting at the beginning of the 20th century to recover the small 
remaining moose population, the regulations have undergone stepwise 
changes (Liberg et al., 2010). Local knowledge and collective action 
have been highly valued in the evolving management system (Danell 
et al., 2016). However, management strategies that worked well to 
increase the moose population faced challenges when exponential po-
pulation growth led to strong negative impacts on forestry, an increased 
frequency of wildlife-related vehicle collisions during the 1980′s 
(Liberg et al., 2010), and increasing levels of conflict, particularly be-
tween forest owners and hunters (Sandström et al., 2013). 
As part of its policymaking process, the Swedish government has 
conducted investigations to identify shortcomings of existing policies 
and guide future improvements. These investigations led to a change in 
moose management policy in 2012 (Bjärstig et al., 2014). The new 
policy modified the governance system to align it with an ecosystem 
approach based on the Malawi principles (CBD SBSTTA, 2000). It is 
thus designed to promote decentralized decision-making with extended 
inclusion of stakeholders in goal formulation while highlighting the 
ecosystem as a focal management level (Swedish Government Bill, 
2009/10:239). The policy acknowledges that moose management is 
characterized by uncertainties, complexity, and change, and therefore 
prescribes adaptive management with a focus on monitoring and sys-
tematic learning. 
This policy can be viewed as another step towards formalization of 
the collaborative aspects of Swedish wildlife governance. County-level 
Wildlife Management Delegations consist of 15–19 representatives for 
various land use and public interest and formulate strategies and/or 
goals for regional wildlife management (Swedish Government Bill, 
2008/09:, 2010). To enable the ecosystem-based moose management 
demanded by the policy and further decentralize decision-making, a 
new governance level was created in 2012: the Moose Management Area 
(MMA). Each MMA should extend over at least 80 % of the habitat of a 
distinct moose population, and is managed by a Moose Management 
Group (MMG, Table A.1). These groups have three members re-
presenting landowners’ interests and three representing hunters, all of 
whom work collaboratively to set goals and formulate moose man-
agement plans for the respective MMA. Previously established volun-
tary Moose Management Units (MMU) were retained to set local goals. 
and formulate 3-year unit-level adaptive management plans. Alter-
natively, hunting can be carried out in License Areas that are granted 
quotas by the County Administrative Board in line with suggestions from 
the relevant MMG. Moose hunting is thus steered by goals set at mul-
tiple levels of the governance system, which necessitates collaboration 
and alignment between them (see Appendix A Table A.1 for a detailed 
overview of the governance system). 
As part of the ongoing policy process, the system introduced in 2012 
has undergone government-mandated evaluations since its im-
plementation (Naturvårdsverket, 2015, 2018). These evaluations 
highlighted potential shortcomings in collaboration and goal fulfilment 
relating to moose harvest quotas and browsing damage. In response, the 
government issued an assignment (N2018/04160/FJR) requiring the 
Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU) to revise educational 
1 The concepts of governance and management have been defined in different 
and partly overlapping ways, and some scholars even use the terms inter-
changeably. Our understanding of collaborative governance is in line with the 
definition offered by Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh (2011): “processes and 
structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people 
constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or 
the public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could 
not otherwise be accomplished”. We thus see management as an aspect within the 
broader governance regime and adaptive management as a specific manage-
ment practice implemented to generate new knowledge (Hasselman, 2017). 
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material for relevant actors and identify collaborative aspects that 
contribute to goal fulfilment and better collaboration in moose man-
agement. Our research was embedded in this assignment: the authors 
have frequently been invited to present at stakeholder workshops and 
collected some of the data underpinning this study while working on 
the assignment (see section B in Appendix). Our quantitative evaluation 
of the system’s effectiveness provides insight into the ways in which 
collaboration dynamics and social-ecological context can influence goal 
fulfilment, which in turn can help inform and improve policymaking 
and management performance. 
1.2. Diagnostic framework 
Our evaluation framework is inspired by the IFCG - Emerson, 
Nabatchi and Balogh’s Integrative Framework for Collaborative 
Governance (Emerson et al., 2011). The IFCG was influenced by pre-
vious work on collaborative governance and includes elements from 
diverse empirical and theoretical frameworks. It has a nested structure 
in which the system’s context influences the collaborative governance 
regime, where collaboration dynamics give rise to outputs that in turn 
lead to outcomes (Emerson et al., 2011). Our focus here is solely on the 
causal links between system context, collaboration dynamics, and out-
comes (Fig. 1). Emerson et al. intentionally avoided rigorously speci-
fying their integrative framework to ensure that it can be used by 
scholars from different disciplines, generalized to describe diverse 
forms of collaborative governance, and used as a basis for more rigor-
ously specified theory testing and modelling (Emerson and Nabatchi, 
2015a, p. 26). In keeping with this approach, we complemented the 
IFCG with elements from a revised version of the SESF to create a de-
tailed diagnostic set-up for testing multiple theories on system context 
and its effects (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2014; Vogt et al., 2015). This 
framework has been used previously to analyse the social-ecological 
context of Swedish moose management (Dressel et al., 2018; Sandström 
et al., 2013). While this previous analysis highlighted critical variables 
and a potential “problem of fit” for moose management, this study takes 
the next step by investigating whether the identified context variables 
affect the governance regime’s performance in terms of its collaboration 
dynamics and outcomes. 
Evaluations of the performance of collaborative governance regimes 
can be multifaceted, focusing on processes and/or varying types of 
outcomes. Emerson and Nabatchi (2015b) illustrated this complexity by 
building a matrix of nine different productivity dimensions to which 
outcomes can relate. In this way, they highlighted the need to con-
cretise what a study actually seeks to evaluate. Following their classi-
fication, we aim to evaluate productivity performance with a focus on 
the effectiveness of reaching desired outcomes or “results on the 
ground” by achieving target goals (i.e. meeting the hunting quotas). 
Because we follow a logic model approach, it is important to dis-
tinguish between processes, output, outcomes, and the causal sequence 
we expect between these components (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015b;  
Thomas and Koontz, 2011). We see management plans formulated by 
the MMGs as direct outputs of their collaboration dynamics (i.e. the 
process, Fig. 1). These plans set clear quantitative and qualitative goals 
and thereby specify what actions should be taken (i.e. how many moose 
should be harvested in a given season and the distribution of the quota 
among cows, bulls, and calves). Quota fulfilment is thus a measure of an 
intermediate ecological outcome because it directly links outcomes of 
actions (i.e. actual numbers of harvested animals) to an output (i.e. the 
goal agreed in the management plan). Reaching quotas is assumed to be 
necessary for achieving the overall desired ecological outcomes (i.e. 
goals in regard to quality and quantity of the moose population and 
acceptable levels of browsing damage). The framework of Emerson 
et al. (2011) identifies key variables of collaborative governance re-
gimes. Below, we outline our empirical and/or theoretically based hy-
potheses about how the system context and collaboration dynamics 
interact and affect outcomes. 
1.2.1. Hypothesis on the effect of collaboration dynamics on outcomes 
Collaboration has been highlighted as a vital factor for improving 
goal-fulfilment in public policy and management (Bodin et al., 2017). It 
could also help reduce implementation uncertainty, a concept that re-
lates to how practitioners in the field meet set quotas and comply with 
regulations (Moa et al., 2017). Within the IFCG, collaboration dynamics 
are characterized in terms of three interactive components: principled 
engagement, shared motivation, and capacity for joint action, which are all 
assumed to be beneficial for effective collaboration and the 
Fig. 1. Graphical illustration of the conceptual model showing (a) the assumed direct effects of the social-ecological system context on the collaboration dynamics, 
(b) the effects of collaboration on outcomes, and (c) the direct effects of context variables on outcomes. The map shows all 148 Moose Management Areas coloured 
according to the social-ecological context in which moose management has been implemented. The gradient ranges from social importance (green) to ecological 
diversity (brown); see Dressel et al. (2018) for more details. 
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performance of the governance regime (Emerson et al., 2011). Prin-
cipled engagement describes the stages of discovery, definition, delib-
eration, and determination that occur among actors. The policy and 
established guidelines for management plans structure this process 
within MMGs quite detailed. Therefore, we focus in this study on ele-
ments of shared motivation and capacity for joint action (Table 1), as these 
two components focus more on the relational and functional qualities of 
collaboration dynamics (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015a). 
Capacity for joined action relates to the functional components of 
collaboration dynamics including procedural and institutional ar-
rangement, leadership, resources, and knowledge (Emerson et al., 
2011). Within this study, we focus on resources and knowledge as en-
abling elements for joint action and achieving preferred outcomes 
(Table 1). Because financial resources within the governance system are 
limited, representatives serving on MMGs receive only a small re-
imbursement each year. Their labour is thus either contributed vo-
luntarily or paid for by their employer if their participation in the MMG 
is classified as one of their working duties. We decided to focus on the 
time that MMG members invest in the collaborative process, which was 
assumed to be an essential resource for good performance of the re-
gime. Frequent communication between actors has shown positive ef-
fects in collaborative governance by helping to develop trust, accep-
tance of outputs, and rule compliance (Dietz et al., 2003; Jager et al., 
2019). This supports two of our hypotheses. First, we hypothesize that 
increased time investment in collaboration between levels will increase quota 
fulfilment by promoting alignment of goals between different manage-
ment levels. Second, we assume that increasing the time invested in the 
collaborative process will increase the actors’ social capital. Similar 
effects were observed in a case study where an increase in meeting 
frequency was found to support the development of trust within wildlife 
management associations (Wagner et al., 2007). However, higher levels 
of social capital are also assumed to reduce transaction costs (i.e. time 
investment) (Ostrom, 2009) and increase knowledge generation 
(Berkes, 2009; Emerson et al., 2011), and common knowledge within a 
user group can also reduce transaction costs (Ostrom, 2009). In line 
with these complex interdependencies, the IFCG assumes that the three 
components of collaboration dynamics are synergistically interrelated, 
reinforcing one-another and ultimately boosting collaborative action 
(Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015b). Thus, we hypothesize that there is a 
relationship between bonding social capital, knowledge and time investment 
but we do not want to specify a cause-and-effect association among them. 
The adaptive co-management philosophy assumes that knowledge is 
important for the development and use of better management practices 
(Berkes, 2017; Plummer, 2009). Goals and action plans are formulated 
based on current knowledge, monitoring regimes are established to 
systematically collect knowledge and new knowledge is co-produced 
with the aim of maximizing the utilization of already existing knowl-
edge that is dispersed among different actors and management levels 
(Armitage et al., 2011; Berkes, 2009). Additionally, it is assumed that 
higher levels of relevant environmental knowledge will lead to colla-
borative outputs of greater environmental quality (Jager et al., 2019;  
Newig et al., 2018). In our case, an increase in the environmental 
quality of the output (i.e. management plans) would take the form of 
goals that are better-adjusted to the ecological circumstances (e.g. 
moose density and potential predation) or improved planning of actions 
(e.g. more efficient spatial distribution of quotas over sub-units). Thus, 
we hypothesize that a higher knowledge level of MMGs will lead to improved 
quota fulfilment. 
Shared motivation is the interpersonal and relational component of 
the collaboration dynamics. It encompasses trust, mutual under-
standing, internal legitimacy, and commitment (Emerson and Nabatchi, 
2015a), and therefore mirrors many dimensions of social capital. Social 
capital can be defined as the networks of social relationships that 
nurture trust through norms of reciprocity (Pelling and High, 2005). A 
lack of social capital has previously been identified as a barrier to 
successful ecosystem-based management (Yaffee, 2011). Social capital 
has also proven vital to the performance of collaborative governance 
regimes (Berkes, 2009; Cheng et al., 2015; Jager et al., 2019), and ef-
fective commons governance (Dietz et al., 2003). A recent meta-ana-
lysis showed that a good communication climate contributes to trust 
and shared norms, which can lead to higher acceptance of governance 
outputs and increase the likelihood of their implementation (Jager 
et al., 2019). Social capital can also help actors to improve their utili-
zation of other resources, such as human capital (i.e. knowledge and 
expertise) or financial capital (Agnitsch et al., 2006; Cinner et al., 
2018). In times of crisis, trust and community cohesion can increase the 
adaptive capacity of actors individually and collectively. Communities 
with high social capital are thus more likely to act collectively towards 
preferred goals (Adger, 2003; Cinner et al., 2018). Different types of 
social capital have been distinguished by research, namely linking, 
bridging, and bonding social capital (Agnitsch et al., 2006; Pelling and 
High, 2005). Bonding social capital arises from relationships within 
homogenous groups, while bridging and linking social capital arise 
from relationships between groups and towards organizations on larger 
scales, respectively. A balance between these different kinds of social 
capital has proven to be essential for collective action and successful 
natural resource management because they play different roles within 
the governance regime (Agnitsch et al., 2006; Grafton, 2005). However, 
since our unit of analysis in this work is MMAs, we focus on bonding 
social capital within MMGs. Based on the arguments above, we hy-
pothesize a positive effect of bonding social capital on outcomes (i.e. quota 
fulfilment). 
1.2.2. Hypothesis on the effects of the social-ecological system context on 
collaboration dynamics and outcomes 
The system context can create barriers to collaboration dynamics 
and productivity performance of collaborative governance regimes 
(Ansell and Gash, 2008; Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015a). Fifteen SES 
Table 1 
List of variables included in the path analysis, including their sample size (n), mean value (M), standard deviation (SD) and range (Min-Max) and information on 
which component and variable they represent according to the SESF and IFCG.           
Component SESF / IFCG Variable Unit n M SD Min Max  
Context RS3 Area size 1000 ha 149 271.80 413.23 20.78 2,781.41 
GS3 Sub-units per MMA count 149 29.30 39.56 1 235 
RS1 Land use diversity H index 149 1.04 0.20 0.62 1.53 
RS7 Fluctuation in forage availability proportion 149 0.30 0.25 0.04 1.59 
RU3c Predation by wolves & bears 1000 ha−1 148 0.45 0.69 0 3.64 
RU3b Density of other ungulates 1000 ha−1 149 12.24 11.83 0 64.47 
RU5b Moose density 1000 ha−1 149 2.49 0.83 0.10 4.25 
I4 Browsing damage proportion 146 0.16 0.10 0.02 0.56 
Collaboration capacity for joint action Time investment – 147 98.19 49.75 7 254.67 
capacity for joint action Knowledge base – 147 3.59 4.06 −8.88 13.35 
shared motivation Bonding social capital – 147 8.25 4.21 −10.28 14.04 
Outcome  Quota fulfilment proportion 146 0.88 0.12 0.25 1.28 
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context variables were previously identified as potential challenges for 
the implemented system because they exhibit considerable spatial 
variation and could lead to an emerging ‘problem of fit’ between cre-
ated institutions and the ecological system (Dressel et al., 2018). Sta-
keholders confirmed that several of these variables present challenges 
for quota fulfilment during a workshop led by two of the authors (see 
section B in Appendix A for more details). Due to restrictions on data 
availability, only eight of these context variables could be included in 
this study. According to the adapted SESF of Vogt et al. (2015), they 
were first-, second-, and third-tier variables. Variables relating to the 
resource system were sector (RS1), size (RS3), and predictability of system 
dynamics (RS7). Variables relating to the resource units (i.e. moose) 
were competition between species (RU3b), predation (RU3c), and the ab-
solute number of units (Ru5b). Additionally, the network structure of the 
governance system (GS3) and conflicts (I4) were included (Table 1). 
Because these context variables present challenges in management, 
we assume that they will necessitate more work (i.e. time investment) 
from involved actors. The size (RS3) and predictability (RS7) of the 
resource system are posited to influence the likelihood of collective 
action because greater effort is required to monitor larger systems with 
low predictability (Ostrom, 2009). Additionally, a large spatial extent 
and complex network structures (GS3) can reduce actors’ ability to 
build suitable institutions and act collectively (Ostrom, 1990). As the 
spatial extent of the area to be managed increases, ecological and social 
variability may also increase, resulting in the inclusion of multiple 
sectors (RS1) with diverging goals within the same management re-
gime. These theoretical arguments align very well with the reality de-
scribed by moose management stakeholders, in which social variability 
(i.e. landownership structures) and the relationships between different 
land use interests (i.e. forest and agricultural) necessitate additional 
collaborative effort and adversely affect goal fulfilment (Table B.1). The 
governance design created an interdependence between levels and 
made alignment of their goals essential (Table A.1). Time investment 
should be higher for MMAs consisting of many sub-units because of the 
need to coordinate and follow-up with each subunit. Diversity in land 
use sectors imposes different demands on the management because 
managers must account for all interests in these multi-use landscapes 
and align wildlife management objectives with them (Apollonio et al., 
2017). Finally, the new policy goal seeks to establish “a moose popu-
lation of high quality that is in balance with available forage resources”, 
whereby forage resources for moose are highly sensitive to forestry 
practices (Liberg et al., 2010; Wallgren et al., 2013). Despite dual ob-
jectives within Swedish forest policy, which have both environmental 
and social aspects, Swedish forests are primarily managed to meet 
production goals (Beland-Lindahl et al., 2017). The resource against 
which the moose population should be balanced is thus subject to a 
separate management and governance regime in addition to being a key 
component of moose management. Forage availability naturally 
changes as a forest progresses through the different successional stages, 
and different forest management actions can cause it to increase or 
decrease within a given MMA. Additionally natural disturbances such 
as fire or wind can cause drastic and unpredictable changes (Lidskog 
and Sjödin, 2016). We assume that a high fluctuation in forage re-
sources creates environmental uncertainty, necessitating a more intense 
collaborative effort for effective monitoring and adaptation of har-
vesting rules. We therefore hypothesize that time investment increases with 
the spatial extent of the MMA, the size of the network (i.e. its number of sub- 
units), the diversity of land-use, and the magnitude of the fluctuations in 
forage availability. 
Uncertainty about ecological processes and the acknowledgement 
that decisions must be made on the basis of imperfect knowledge was 
one reason for the introduction of the new governance regime (Swedish 
Government Bill, 2009/10:239). As outlined above, the predictability of 
system dynamics (RS7) relating to forage availability is a source of 
environmental uncertainty that might limit actors’ relevant ecological 
knowledge. There is also monitoring uncertainty relating to the 
presence of other ungulate and carnivore species, which might lead to 
competition between species (RU3b) or predation (RU3c). Within our 
survey (see methods section), members of all but one of the MMGs 
(138) stated that they require additional knowledge to support the 
management process. Of the respondents who specified more precisely 
what kind of knowledge they needed, members of 73 MMGs mentioned 
questions regarding forage availability and browsing pressure. Re-
spondents also expressed a need for more knowledge about local moose 
populations (60 MMGs), the presence of other ungulates and their in-
teractions with moose (39 MMGs), and predation by large carnivores 
(34 MMGs). Therefore, we hypothesize that high numbers of other ungulate 
species, predation by large carnivores, and fluctuations in forage availability 
adversely affect the knowledge base of MMGs. 
Conflicts can impose strain on collaboration dynamics and should 
be considered within the system context (Emerson et al., 2011). 
Therefore, we assume that some ecological context variables have ne-
gative effects on the bonding social capital of MMGs. Conflicts in un-
gulate management are often caused by high ungulate densities and 
their negative impact on otherwise valuable resources such as agri-
cultural crops or commercially harvested trees (Apollonio et al., 2010;  
Apollonio et al., 2017). Scots pine (Pinus sylvestris) is a common forage 
resource for moose but also a significant commercial tree species in 
Sweden. Therefore, moose foraging creates conflicts among stake-
holders (Liberg et al., 2010; Månsson et al., 2007; Wallgren et al., 
2013). Browsing damage to Scots pine is surveyed by the Forest agency 
and can be seen as an indicator of potential conflict (I4). The wish for 
high moose densities from hunting interests is commonly portrayed as a 
contributing factor to this conflict (Liberg et al., 2010; Månsson et al., 
2007). We therefore see high numbers of moose (Ru5b) as a possible 
constraint on collaboration within MMGs. In areas with high densities 
of other ungulate species, there might be competition (RU3b) between 
species for available forage resources, which could lead to increased 
browsing damages to scots pine (Kalén, 2005; Pfeffer et al., 2020). 
Furthermore, other ungulate species such as fallow deer (Dama dama) 
and wild boar (Sus scrofa) commonly cause damage to agricultural crop 
fields (Official Report of the Swedish government, 2014:54). Such da-
mage may create additional tensions between landowner and hunter 
representatives who must work together within MMGs. Based on this, 
we hypothesize that high levels of browsing damage to scots pine and high 
densities of moose and other ungulate species will adversely affect the 
bonding social capital of MMGs. 
As discussed above, there are several ways by which the social- 
ecological context could indirectly affect the performance of the col-
laborative governance regime via its influence on collaboration dy-
namics (Paths a and b in Fig. 1). However, it could also have direct 
effects on hunters’ likelihood of fulfilling harvest quotas. Previous 
studies investigated this implementation uncertainty and discovered 
critical attributes of wildlife, habitat and hunters (Bischof et al., 2012;  
Lebel et al., 2012). High wildlife densities had a positive effect on 
hunting success (Bischof et al., 2012; Schmidt et al., 2005). Therefore, 
we hypothesize that a higher absolute number of moose (Ru5b) will make it 
easier to fill set quotas. Different landscape characteristics such as the 
density of roads also influence harvesting success (Lebel et al., 2012;  
Schmidt et al., 2005), and fragmentation in multi-use landscapes can set 
limitations for common moose hunting practices such as the use of free 
roaming dogs (Hiedanpää and Pellikka, 2015). Based on this, we hy-
pothesize a negative effect of land use diversity on quota fulfilment. Hunting 
effort (i.e. days spent hunting) has been associated with a higher like-
lihood of successful harvesting in Alaska’s moose population (Schmidt 
et al., 2005). A study conducted in 2005 showed that the average 
Swedish hunter spent yearly 11 days hunting moose and 17 days pur-
suing other game species, and that hunting effort contributed positively 
to the harvest of moose (Boman et al., 2011). Since then, the densities 
of the other ungulate species have changed drastically; for example, the 
wild boar harvest rose from 23,000 (hunting season 05/06) to 115,000 
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animals (hunting season 17/18)2 . Given that the number of hunters has 
fallen slightly since 2005 (Eriksson et al., 2018) and that the time in-
vested in hunting per person might not have changed dramatically, we 
hypothesise that high densities of other ungulates might reduce effort in-
vested into hunting moose and thus have a negative effect on quota fulfil-
ment. 
2. Methods 
We used path analysis to assess direct and indirect effects of the 
social-ecological context on the collaboration dynamics and outcomes.  
Fig. 2 shows hypothesized paths between the different variables. Below, 
each variable is described briefly and their assumed effects on the 
collaboration dynamics and/or outcomes are specified. Table 1 pro-
vides an overview of all included variables as well as their means, 
standard deviations, and ranges. 
2.1. Outcome variable 
We requested all moose management plans created between 2014 
and 2018 via the respective county administrative boards. Management 
plans cover a three-year period and are structured according to a 
template; they specify how many moose should be harvested per season 
and describe the area’s environmental conditions (e.g. the extent of 
predation by carnivores, frequency of moose-car collisions, and forest 
conditions). Because the system focuses on learning and adaption, 
managers can update plans frequently to accommodate environmental 
changes. We therefore used the newest version of the management plan 
for each area and worked backwards in time to recreate the goal for 
each hunting season. We reviewed 468 management plans for 149 
MMAs. At the end of each hunting season, it is mandatory to report the 
moose harvest. This data is publicly available via www.älgdata.se,3 
from which we extracted the number of harvested moose per MMA for 
the hunting seasons 2014/15–2018/19. We then calculated the ratio of 
harvested moose to the quotas specified in the management plans. To 
get a more stable measure and account for unforeseen variation in in-
dividual single years (e.g. due to extreme climate conditions), we cal-
culated mean values over three years (hunting season 15/16–17/18). 
This mean value constituted our dependent variable Quota fulfilment. 
2.2. Collaboration variables 
Information on the collaboration dynamics was collected via a 
questionnaire sent to representatives serving on MMGs. In 2016, we 
administered an online survey to all representatives in 139 of 140 
MMGs (N = 765). After three personalized contacts, including the 
option of a paper survey, a response rate of 82 % (n = 624) was 
achieved. Response rates were similar across counties and interest 
groups. Nevertheless, a phone follow-up was conducted to test for non- 
response bias, which revealed no significant difference between re-
spondents and non-respondents. The mean respondent age was 58 years 
(range 26–82) and 95 % were male. See Dressel, Johansson, Ericsson, 
and Sandström (2020) for a more detailed description of the data col-
lection process. 
Three concepts were considered in this study: the time each group 
invests into collaboration dynamics, their self-assessed knowledge base, 
and the bonding social capital within the group. The exact wording of 
all used items together with their means and standard deviations are 
presented in Table C.1 in the Appendix. Because MMAs are the unit of 
analysis in this work, we calculated mean values per group; these were 
based on 4.5 respondents on average. 
2.2.1. Time investment 
Respondents were asked to report how many hours they had spent 
on different tasks relating to moose management over the last 12 
months. The questionnaire included 12 items covering activities re-
lating to individual tasks (e.g. educating themselves or analysing data), 
collaboration tasks (e.g. talking to MMUs) and activities connected to 
establishing management plans (e.g. meetings within the group) (Table 
C.1). Five answer categories were offered: 0 h, 1−8 h, 9−20 h, 21−40 
h, and > 40 h. We calculated a composite score across these 12 items 
for each participant, using the starting value of each category (i.e. 0, 1, 
9, 21, 41) to define the minimum time investment per participant. Time 
investment values could thus theoretically range from zero hours to 492 
h. We excluded respondents who had missing values for multiple items, 
giving a sample size of 614. The mean score for each group was cal-
culated and formed the variable Time investment. We expected a positive 
effect of Time investment on Quota fulfilment. 
2.2.2. Knowledge base 
The questionnaire included 12 items asking respondents to assess 
their knowledge about different issues relevant to moose management 
(i.e. ungulate populations, forest conditions, predation, and adaptive 
management). These 12 items were previously used to represent 
Knowledge base (see Dressel et al., 2020), and have undergone testing 
for reliability as well as convergent and discriminant validity. Their 
standardized factor loadings from a previous Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis were used to calculate a composite score per participant (Table 
C.1). This allows us to account for measurement error because these 
items should represent the latent variable Knowledge base. Answers 
were given on a 5-point scale ranging from -2 = strongly disagree to 
+2 = strongly agree. Given the factor loadings, the composite score 
could take values between -16.54 to +16.54. Respondents with missing 
data were removed before calculating the mean value per group. We 
assume a positive effect of Knowledge base on Quota fulfilment. 
2.2.3. Bonding social capital 
Social capital is a multifaceted concept (Pelling and High, 2005). As 
in previous studies, we operationalized bonding social capital as a 
combination of communication, collaboration, and trust within the 
MMGs (Dressel et al., 2020). Four communication, three collaboration, 
and four trust items were weighted according to their standardized 
factor loadings (Table C.1) and summed according to their factor 
loading on an overall Bonding social capital composite score per person. 
Answers were given using the 5-point scale described above, and the 
theoretical range for the composite score was from -14.87 to +14.87. 
Respondents with missing data were removed before calculating the 
mean value per group. We assumed a positive effect of Bonding social 
capital on Quota fulfilment. 
2.3. Context variables 
2.3.1. Area size 
We extracted the size (terrestrial area) of each MMA based on a 
MMA shapefile for the hunting season 2015/16 after excluding water 
bodies.4 This spatial analysis was performed in ArcMap (Version 
10.4.1.568, © 1999−2015 Esri. Inc.). We set the variable unit at 1000 
ha to make the magnitudes of the mean values and variance for this 
variable similar to those for the others. We expect that bigger areas will 
require more collaborative effort from MMGs, resulting in a positive 
effect of Area size on Time investment. 
2.3.2. Sub-units per MMA 
Moose management units and license areas are required to report 
2 Source: https://rapport.viltdata.se/statistik/ Public database on Swedish 
wildlife harvest data 
3 Hereafter we will refer to this database as ÄLGDATA. 
4 Waterbodies were available via the Geographic Swedish Data provided by 
The Swedish Land Survey (Lantmäteriet). 
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their moose harvest in ÄLGDATA. We counted the number of sub-units 
(MMUs and license areas) per MMA for the hunting seasons 2014/15 
and 2015/16 and calculated their mean value. We hypothesize that a 
high number of Sub-units per MMA will require more Time investment 
from MMGs, thus having a positive effect. 
2.3.3. Land use diversity 
Based on the National vegetation cover data5 we extracted per MMA 
the proportion of six land use types: wetland, agriculture, artificial 
surface, water, forest, and other open land. In ecological research, di-
versity across sites is often compared using diversity indices (Magurran, 
2013). Here, we used the Shannon diversity index (H) as a measure of 
Land use diversity. This index takes the area proportion (pi) of each 
specific land use type i into account: 
=H p pln( )
i
i i
Areas with comparatively even distributions of land use types will 
have high H values while those with a more uniform dominance of one 
type will have lower values. We expected more diverse MMAs to re-
quire more effort from MMGs to collect information and collaborate 
with different land use interests. Furthermore, diverse land use might 
adversely affect hunting opportunities and effectiveness, making it 
harder to fulfil set quotas. We thus expected Land use diversity to have a 
positive effect on Time investment and a negative effect on Quota fulfil-
ment. 
2.3.4. Fluctuation in forage availability 
We used official data on forage productive forest area for each MMA 
as reported annually by the Swedish Forest Agency, which uses satellite 
images to estimate of the total area of young forest stands between 1 
and 6 m tall that are suitable for moose browsing (Kalén and Bergquist, 
2004) and references therein). As an indicator of variability in forage 
availability, we calculated the sum of the proportional change (F) in the 
forage productive forest area (A) from one year (t) to the next (t + 1) 











While some areas showed a constant increase or decrease, others 
displayed variability in both directions during the considered period. 
We expected a high fluctuation to create multiple challenges for man-
agement. Firstly, it is a source of uncertainty that must be accounted for 
when collecting information on the area and setting management plans. 
Secondly, it might make it harder to set goals for a moose population 
that should be in balance with the available food resources to avoid 
unacceptable browsing damage. We therefore expect Fluctuation in 
forage availability to increase Time investment (positive effect) from 
MMGs while also reducing their Knowledge base (negative effect). 
2.3.5. Predation by wolves & bears 
Predation by large carnivores is a source of natural mortality that 
must be considered when setting quotas for moose hunting. In Sweden, 
brown bears (Ursus arctos) and grey wolves (Canis lupus) are the species 
that commonly prey on moose (Tallian et al., 2017). We extracted es-
timated levels of predation by wolves and bears from the 468 collected 
moose management plans. Plans specify how many wolf packs and in-
dividual bears live in the MMA in question and then estimate how many 
moose they will prey upon in a given year. We summed the number of 
moose preyed upon per 1000 ha by both species and calculated the 
mean value for the hunting seasons 14/15 and 15/16. We hypothesize 
that Predation by wolves & bears is a source of uncertainty for manage-
ment, which will negatively affect moose managers’ Knowledge base. 
2.3.6. Density of other ungulates 
In the absence of systematic monitoring of other ungulate species, 
we used harvest data as a density indicator. Harvest numbers for red 
deer (Cervus elaphus), fallow deer (Dama dama), roe deer (Capreolus 
capreolus), mouflon (Ovis orientalis), and wild boar (Sus scrofa) are 
Fig. 2. Path analysis results. Straight arrows depict the hypothesized direct and indirect effects of context and collaboration variables on Quota fulfilment. Curved 
double-arrows visualize assumed covariance between the collaboration variables. Dashed arrows represent insignificant effects, while solid arrows are significant. 
Displayed values are standardized path coefficients with significance thresholds of *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
5 Nationell marktäke data; Raster data with a resolution of 10m, provided by 
the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (available for download at 
https://www.naturvardsverket.se/Sa-mar-miljon/Kartor/Nationella- 
Marktackedata-NMD/Ladda-ned/) 
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commonly reported per hunting district.6 Hunting district borders do 
not always directly overlap with MMA borders. We therefore assumed a 
homogenous distribution of harvest numbers across hunting districts to 
calculate harvest data per MMA based on the proportional overlap 
between hunting districts and MMAs according to shapefiles for the 
hunting season 2015/16. This spatial analysis was performed in 
ArcMap (Version 10.4.1.568, © 1999−2015 Esri. Inc.). For each spe-
cies, we calculated a harvest rate per 1000 ha of land area for each 
MMA and accumulated harvest rates across species into an indicator for 
all “other ungulates”. This calculation was done for the hunting seasons 
of 14/15 and 15/16. The mean value for these two hunting seasons 
constitutes our variable Density of other ungulates. We expect the pre-
sence of other ungulates to create uncertainty in the ecological dy-
namics of the ungulate community (leading to a negative effect on 
managers’ Knowledge base). Furthermore, high densities of other un-
gulates might increase browsing damage and/or damage to agricultural 
landscapes, which can hamper collaboration between landowner and 
hunter representatives. This would mean a negative effect of Density of 
other ungulates on Bonding social capital. We predict that the presence of 
other ungulates will also have a direct negative effect on Quota fulfil-
ment because the availability of these species may cause hunters to 
place a lesser focus on moose. 
2.3.7. Moose density 
There are various monitoring tools for estimating moose densities. 
The use and adequacy of individual methods differs across the country 
(Spitzer et al., 2019), but harvest statistics have performed well as 
spatiotemporal density indices for moose (Ueno et al., 2014). Based on 
this and in an attempt to keep Moose density similar to Density of other 
ungulates, we used harvest data as a density indicator. We extracted the 
number of harvested moose per 1000 ha for each MMA from ÄLGDATA 
and calculated its mean value for the hunting seasons 14/15 and 15/16. 
Because high moose densities may be associated with an increase in 
negative impacts (e.g. browsing damage or traffic accidents), we pos-
tulated that it might lead to more disagreement between different in-
terest groups. We thus expect a negative effect of Moose density on 
Bonding social capital. At the same time, high moose densities are as-
sumed to make it easier to reach set goals, and thereby positively affect 
Quota fulfilment. 
2.3.8. Browsing damage 
We used official data from the national inventory of moose 
browsing damage (Äbin) conducted by the Swedish Forest Agency. 
Among other variables, Äbin estimates the annual proportion of Scots 
pine (Pinus sylvestris) in young forest stands that is damaged by un-
gulates. In 2015 and 2016, inventories were conducted at the MMA 
level for the first time (they had previously been conducted at the 
county level). Each MMA is monitored every second year other than in 
the two northernmost counties, where MMAs are monitored annually. 
We used the proportion of damaged pine stems as an indicator of 
Browsing damage. If data for both calendar years were available, we 
calculated the mean value. We hypothesize that browsing damage, as a 
source of conflict, will negatively affect Bonding social capital. 
2.4. Data analysis 
We used confirmatory path analysis to test the effects of (a) context 
variables on collaboration dynamics, (b) collaboration variables on 
quota fulfilment, and (c) context variables on quota fulfilment (Fig. 1). 
Our unit of analysis was Moose Management Areas (n = 149). Path 
analysis assumes causal relationships between variables, and thus re-
quires a clear temporal sequence of events (Hair et al., 2013). This 
means that if we assume one variable to cause another, the causing one 
must happen/exist before the other in time. In our study, most context 
variables were based on data for the hunting seasons 14/15 and 15/16. 
Information on collaboration dynamics was collected in 2016, but we 
assume that the responses represent the respondents’ experiences over a 
longer period, as only 2 % of the respondents said they were new to 
their MMG, and 80 % had been in the group for at least two years. We 
therefore consider it reasonable to assume that our measure of the 
collaboration dynamics affected goal fulfilment over multiple years 
(15/16–17/18). 
Some of the variables had up to 2 % missing data (Table 1). Listwise 
deletion was applied, which resulted in the use of 142 complete ob-
servations. Pearson’s product moment correlations between variables 
were below .70 (see Appendix Table C.2) and the VIF values were < 3, 
therefore we deemed the degree of multicollinearity acceptable and 
applied no remedies. 
Path analysis assumes a multivariate normal distribution. We cal-
culated Mardia's multivariate skewness coefficient (1602.01, p < .001) 
and the multivariate kurtosis coefficient (15.75, p < .001), which in-
dicated that multivariate normality could not be assumed. We therefore 
used a robust version of the maximum likelihood estimator for our path 
analysis. Given the characteristics of our sample and proposed model, 
we decided to use lavaan’s MLR estimator (Rosseel, 2012). MLR cal-
culates robust ‘Huber-White’ standard errors based on the observed 
information matrix and a robust likelihood ratio test statistic, which is 
asymptotically equivalent to the Yuan-Bentler T2* test statistic 
(Maydeu-Olivares, 2017). 
Quota fulfilment was the dependent variable in the model, while 
collaboration variables (i.e. Time investment, Knowledge base and 
Bonding social capital) acted as dependent and independent variables in 
the different paths of the model and were thus assumed to play a 
mediating role between the social-ecological context and quota fulfil-
ment (path a + b in Fig. 1). We therefore calculated the indirect effects 
of context variables on outcomes and the total effect of the three con-
text variables (i.e. Land use diversity, Density of other ungulates, and 
Moose density) that had indirect and direct paths to Quota fulfilment. 
Standard errors for indirect effects and total effects were calculated 
using the Delta method (Rosseel, 2012). 
To determine whether our model represented the observed data 
well, we used absolute and relative goodness of fit measures with 
thresholds adjusted to our sample size and number of variables (Hair 
et al., 2013). For absolute fit, we inspected the Chi-square (χ2) results 
for testing the exact fit hypothesis and aimed for a Standardized Root 
Mean Square Residual (SRMR) below .05. The Tucker-Lewis Index 
(TLI), a parsimony fit index, indicates good model fit when its value 
is > .97, and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 
and its 90 % confidence interval should be below .08 (Hair et al., 2013). 
Since we used a robust version of the ML estimator to handle the non- 
normality of our data, robust versions of χ2, TLI, and RMSEA were 
calculated. All statistical analyses were conducted in R (R Core Team, 
2019) using the lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012), a covariance-structure 
analysis package. We treated all variables as continuous and used .05 as 
the cut-off for statistical significance. No modifications to the original 
model were made. 
3. Results 
The path analysis explained 22 % of the variation in our dependent 
variable Quota fulfilment. The model was based on 142 observations (95 
% of all areas) and we freely estimated 23 parameters (see Fig. 2). A 
robust χ2 value of 20.353, (df = 19, p = .374) and a SRMR of .030 
indicated a good absolute model fit. A robust RMSEA of .022 (90 % CI 
= .000–.076) and robust TLI of .996 confirmed the acceptable fit of our 
path analysis. Unstandardized estimates, standard errors, and results of 
significance testing for all estimated parameters are presented in the 
supplementary material (Table C.3.). 
We found two significant direct effects of the social-ecological 6 Swedish: Jaktvårdskrets 
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context on the collaboration dynamics. Time investment was sig-
nificantly higher in big MMAs and if there was a high Fluctuation in 
forage availability (β = .17, p = .023), with the Area size (β = .42, 
p < .001) having twice the influence of forage fluctuations. Overall, we 
explained 20 % of the variation in Time investment. Contradicting our 
expectations, Land use diversity had a negative path coefficient for Time 
investment, but the result was non-significant (β = −.12, p = .097). 
Similarly, the Density of other ungulates had a negative effect of −.16 on 
Knowledge base, but with a p-value of .069 it was above the threshold of 
statistical significance. Thus, none of the context variables significantly 
affected the Knowledge base or Bonding social capital of MMGs. 
As expected, collaboration variables were found to have positive 
effects on outcomes (Fig. 2). Time investment and Knowledge base had 
significant positive effects on Quota fulfilment, with standardized path 
coefficients of .17 (p = .023) and .19 (p = .014), respectively. This 
indicates that outcomes were better in areas where MMGs invested 
more time or felt they had a good knowledge base. Furthermore, we 
found a significant covariance of .29 (p = .001) between Knowledge 
base and Bonding social capital, indicating a positive link between these 
two collaboration variables. 
Of the three context variables that we expected to have direct effects 
on outcomes, two yielded significant estimates. Quota fulfilment was 
lower in areas with high Land use diversity (β = −.21, p = .041) and 
areas with a high Density of other ungulates (β = −.14, p = .035). 
Moose density on the other hand had no significant effect (β = .09, p = 
.332) on Quota fulfilment. 
When inspecting the indirect effects of context variables on Quota 
fulfilment, we discovered that Area size had a small but significant effect 
(β = .07, p = .044): bigger areas led to increased Time investment by 
MMGs. None of the other indirect effects were significant; estimates for 
them are presented in the Appendix in Table C.3. When accounting for 
its indirect and direct effect on Quota fulfilment, Land use diversity had a 
total effect of −.24 (p = .035). The Density of other ungulates had no 
significant indirect effect on Quota fulfilment via decreased knowledge 
or bonding social capital in MMGs but had a total effect of -.17 (p = 
.009). Moose Density had no significant overall effect (β = .09, p = 
.339) on Quota fulfilment. 
4. Discussion 
Our study provided a unique opportunity to connect the social- 
ecological context to stakeholders’ personal experiences of collabora-
tion dynamics, and to compare their set goals to outcomes. This is 
important given that the governance system of moose in Sweden relies 
heavily on voluntary efforts to handle the inherent conflict between 
forestry and hunting interests. Our results show that some social-eco-
logical context variables have direct effects on the time investment 
required of participants and thus influenced collaboration dynamics. 
More reported time investment and a stronger perceived knowledge 
base led to higher quota fulfilment, while ecological contexts involving 
diverse land use and high densities of other ungulates challenged suc-
cessful outcomes. 
4.1. The influence of social-ecological context on collaboration dynamics 
The only significant direct effects of social-ecological context vari-
ables on collaboration dynamics identified by our model were those 
relating to the amount of time MMGs had to invest. In line with our 
predictions, larger MMAs and pronounced fluctuations in forage 
availability necessitated greater time investment. While we assume that 
larger areas increase the time spent on analysing monitoring data and 
collaboration, there are other factors that could contribute to the ob-
served effect. MMAs tend to be larger in the north of the country 
(Fig. 1), which is dominated by forestry and where moose occur in 
higher numbers than other ungulates. This might increase the relative 
importance of moose management and actors’ willingness to invest 
time. Further research will be needed to understand the exact me-
chanisms and actors’ motivations for investing time. Environmental 
uncertainty in the form of fluctuations in forage availability may in-
crease the demand for monitoring or more frequent revision of existing 
management plans and strategies. Uncertainty was found to increase 
transaction costs in other studies on collaborative resource manage-
ment (Adhikari and Lovett, 2006). Contrary to our expectations, the 
actual number of sub-units had no significant effect on time investment, 
and the coefficient for land use diversity was actually negative. Diverse 
landscapes offer a variety of ecosystem services, and land use diversity 
is known to overlap with the presence of other ungulate species (Fig. 1, 
brown area of the map). This might reduce the importance of moose 
hunting relative to other hunting and land use forms, prompting hunter 
and landowner representatives to spend less time dealing directly with 
moose. 
The participants’ perception of their own knowledge base was not 
influenced by high fluctuations in forage availability, the presence of 
large carnivores, or other ungulates. However, the latter variable had a 
noticeable negative path coefficient and was barely above the level of 
statistical significance. Based on our workshop and survey material, we 
concluded that stakeholders are displaying adaptive capacity towards 
these possible sources of uncertainty. In our survey, participants from 
90 different MMGs reported that they had developed local monitoring 
methods for other ungulate species. Thus, while other ungulates might 
be a challenge, many groups had developed ways of collecting knowl-
edge on these species. An additional explanation for the non-significant 
effects may be geographical variation in the presence of these factors. 
As described earlier, the presence of other ungulate species and large 
carnivores either follows a geographical gradient or is restricted to 
certain regions. Given that we used MMAs as unit of analysis, we could 
not test geographically separated models for northern and southern 
Sweden because the sample sizes would have been too small. It may 
thus be that some of these factors would have regionally significant 
effects on knowledge. 
Geographic variation could also impact the effects of high densities 
of other ungulates, moose densities, and browsing damage on bonding 
social capital in MMGs. This may be why no significant effects on 
bonding social capital were observed, in contradiction to our hypoth-
esis. On the other hand, this could be interpreted as a positive feature of 
the studied system. Bonding social capital was relatively high in many 
groups, with a mean value of 8.25 (SD = 4.21) on a scale ranging from 
−14.87 to 14.87. This may indicate that groups have built solid 
bonding ties that can withstand external stressors such as conflicts over 
browsing pressure. Instead, groups created a collaboration climate that 
is built on trust and allows for the discussion and handling of chal-
lenges. 
4.2. The influence of collaboration dynamics on outcomes 
Tests of the link between collaboration dynamics in terms of shared 
motivation (i.e. social capital) and capacity for joint action (i.e. re-
sources and knowledge) to manage goal conflicts and outcomes re-
vealed positive effects of time investment and a high knowledge base on 
quota fulfilment. Multiple components of time investment were con-
sidered, including time investment on individual tasks (e.g. group 
members educating themselves or analysing data), collaboration tasks 
(e.g. talking to MMUs and representatives of other interests), and ac-
tivities connected to establishing management plans (e.g. meetings 
within the group). While our analysis shows a causal link between time 
investment and quota fulfilment, the direct mechanism is open to in-
terpretation. Each component could contribute in a different way. On 
the one hand, investment in collaboration with MMUs and local land-
owner and hunter representatives could lead to better anchoring of the 
set goals and planned management actions among the involved actors. 
Local hunting teams are the ones who ultimately conduct harvesting 
based on the established quotas. Including these teams in the goal- 
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setting process could increase the legitimacy of plans and the likelihood 
of actors working towards a common goal, leading to effective conflict 
management (Newig et al., 2018). This kind of investment can also 
create bridging social capital, which can foster rule compliance and be 
beneficial for the alignment of management actions across scales 
(Grafton, 2005). On the other hand, time investment in analysing data, 
preparing for, and actually attending meetings to set and revise plans 
should also be beneficial for quota fulfilment. More preparation and 
discussion of plans might lead to quotas that are better adjusted to 
social and ecological conditions, which could contribute not only to the 
fulfilment of local and regional goals but also national policy objectives 
as stated by the Swedish government and parliament. Further research 
will be needed to disentangle different types of time investment, the 
potential role of bridging social capital, and the mechanisms by which 
time investment improves quota fulfilment. 
Better-adjusted plans could also be part of the positive effect of 
knowledge base on quota fulfilment, keeping in line with the hypothesis 
that a higher standard of outputs increases the likelihood of successful 
implementation (Newig et al., 2018). Groups that believe they possess 
sufficient knowledge about the current ungulate population, forage 
availability, predation, and local variation might feel more confident, 
leading to the formulation of more realistic quotas, which are thereby 
easier to reach. Adequate knowledge (particularly in relation to local 
variations in moose densities) could contribute to a better distribution 
of sub-quotas among MMUs and license areas. This is consistent with 
some of the obstacles discussed by stakeholders in our workshop on 
goal fulfilment, who reported that under certain distribution schemes, 
parts of the quota might be “locked-in” in areas where the moose 
density does not allow for the set target to be reached swiftly. This 
might be related to certain traditions of allocating quotas between sub- 
units or insufficient knowledge of seasonal and geographic variations in 
moose populations. 
The perceived knowledge base also exhibited positive co-variance 
with bonding social capital. Higher perceived knowledge within MMGs 
could reduce the frequency of discussions or disagreements based on 
uncertainty, thereby helping to build bonding social capital and reduce 
conflicts. At the same time, high social capital in the group can benefit 
individual and group-level knowledge because it leads actors to trust 
one-another, strengthening communication and maximizing the utility 
of individual human capital by encouraging members to learn from 
each other (Grafton, 2005). Bonding social capital in itself had no direct 
effect on quota fulfilment, however. We assumed that better colla-
boration and trust between group members may result in the setting of 
goals that are considered more legitimate, leading to better outcomes. 
In statistical terms, it could be that having relatively high bonding so-
cial capital in most groups (as indicated by the high mean value), could 
not explain a significant amount of the variation in goal fulfilment. 
From a theoretical perspective, it may be that bridging and linking 
social capital, i.e. trust and positive collaboration between MMGs and 
their sub-units might be a more important factor for quota fulfilment. 
Further studies will be needed to explore this possible relationship and 
examine goal alignment between levels. 
4.3. The influence of social-ecological context on outcomes 
While collaboration aspects led to better outcomes, two context 
variables proved to be counterproductive for quota fulfilment: high 
land-use diversity and density of other ungulate species. While some 
MMAs in the North are clearly dominated by forests (which account for 
up to 85 % of their total area), MMAs elsewhere (especially in central 
and southern Sweden) can be comprised of a mixture of agriculture, 
forestry, wetlands, open areas and artificial surfaces. Those multi-
functional landscapes provide diverse bundles of ecosystem services 
that are highly valued by different stakeholders (Queiroz et al., 2015). 
Thus, these multi-use landscapes increase the likelihood of frequent 
encounters between moose hunters and other stakeholders using the 
same landscape. The presence of urban and peri-urban areas in parti-
cular can have practical implications for moose hunting practices, such 
as limitations on the use of free-roaming hunting dogs, or the need for 
adaptive capacity in moose hunting strategies (Hiedanpää and Pellikka, 
2015). Diverse land-use can thus reduce the success rates in the adap-
tive management process. Another possible explanation is the structure 
of landownership: the number of individual landowners per unit area in 
southern Sweden is more than twice that in the north. It is therefore 
possible that land use diversity partly reflects another north-south 
gradient that may directly affect quota fulfilment. 
The presence of other ungulate species might create attractive al-
ternative hunting opportunities that cause hunters to shift their focus 
away from moose. Red deer aside, no set quotas or management plans 
are required for other ungulates. These species thus offer hunters more 
individual freedom and require less transaction costs and collaborative 
efforts than being part of the moose management system. Hunters can 
individually decide how many individuals of the other ungulate species 
they want to shoot on their land during the hunting season. Although 
hunting seasons are defined separately for each ungulate species, most 
of them overlap during fall and winter times. Consequently, hunting 
activities are to some extent divided between several species, whereby 
the harvest ratio between other ungulates and moose can be as high as 
50:1 in some MMAs. The current moose management system was de-
signed on the basis of an ecosystem approach, but our results indicate 
possible limitations to this. While management decisions were decen-
tralized and management areas were designed to cover distinct moose 
populations, multi-species management was not thoroughly in-
corporated into the management system. Current management plans 
account for the presence of large carnivores and forest conditions, but 
no systematic integration of other ungulate species is performed. 
Because our results show that high densities of other ungulates nega-
tively influence moose quota fulfilment, this suggests that management 
performance could be improved by adapting strategies that allow for 
co-management of all species and balance efforts between species. This 
is also consistent with a recent call from leading wildlife biologists to 
adapt a more holistic perspective in European ungulate management 
(Apollonio et al., 2017). 
Our study used a holistic approach based on a complex model to 
understand variation in quota fulfilment. This model explained 22 % of 
the variation, which could be considered low, but one should note that 
we aggregated and combined available data from different sources and 
collected over several years. We are aware of possible limitations in our 
variable selection. Our measure of quota fulfilment cannot account for 
rapid changes in the social-ecological context, which might influence 
annual performance. Workshop participants named factors such as 
climatic events (e.g. extreme snow or dry summers) and quick ecolo-
gical changes leading to high natural mortality (e.g. a wolf pack sud-
denly entering the area or a disease outbreak). A social factor that some 
participants mentioned as creating barriers to quota fulfilment is land 
ownership structure (Appendix Table B.1). We are also aware that 
quota fulfilment inevitably depends on how and what goals are set. As 
noted previously, set goals can have detrimental effects on quota ful-
filment if they are unrealistic or not co-created with sub-units. While 
knowledge and time investment might contribute to better-accepted 
and adjusted goals, more research on the quality of set goals is needed. 
Future studies should thus measure the local acceptance of set goals and 
their ecological feasibility. Furthermore, since quota fulfilment is an 
intermediate ecological outcome, further studies on desired final eco-
logical outcomes (i.e. high quality moose populations and acceptable 
browsing damages) will be needed to properly evaluate the perfor-
mance of the governance regime. Given the current data availability, 
this was unfortunately not possible. 
5. Conclusions 
This study offered an opportunity to compare the goals of a 
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collaborative governance process to its outcomes while accounting for 
context and actors’ perceptions. It thus represents a truly inter-
disciplinary effort to link social and ecological dynamics. Our approach 
shows how qualitative data and a close collaboration with practitioners 
and stakeholders can enrich quantitative modelling. We consider the 
use of actors’ experiences of collaboration dynamics (as opposed to 
researcher-based assessments) to be a key advantage of our study. More 
research applying complementary qualitative and quantitative methods 
to triangulate causality and the underlying mechanisms is needed to 
obtain a situated understanding of success and failure in collaborative 
natural resource governance and enable systematic learning. 
Nevertheless, some of the criticism that was raised towards other 
research evaluating collaborative governance regimes also applies to 
our study. Critics have argued that treatment and control set-ups are 
needed to really determine whether the collaborative process causes the 
observed changes in outcome variables or whether other confounding 
factors exist (Ferraro et al., 2019). Experimental setups of this type are 
rarely possible in real-world governance implementations. Never-
theless, we are confident that our cross-site study allowed us to disen-
tangle the effects of collaboration process and context on outcomes. 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that average quota fulfilment within the 
investigated period was 88 % (SD = 12.5 %) compared to reports of 
54–58 % quota fulfilment prior to the policy change (Swedish 
Government Bill, 2009/10:239). 
In future, it will be important to monitor additional performance 
measures to enable holistic evaluation of the governance regime 
(Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015b). In accordance with the stated goals of 
the new policy, ecological monitoring regimes are in place to evaluate 
qualitative aspects of the moose population (e.g. calf weights and re-
cruitment rates) and impacts on the forest ecosystem (e.g. browsing 
damage and recruitment of certain tree species). However, monitoring 
of process performance and social outcomes are not embedded in the 
management structure, even though the changes to the policy were 
made with the goal of reducing conflicts between actors. Thus, repeated 
measurements of process aspects such as social capital, knowledge, 
leadership, legitimacy and commitment are relevant for both research 
and policy development. Ultimately, the system’s sustainability will 
depend on both its social and its ecological performance. This is in line 
with a recent call from Waylen et al. (2019) for policy-driven mon-
itoring and evaluation that lifts the focus from monitoring only man-
agement-related indicators to broader aspects of the governance re-
gime. 
Lastly, from a policy perspective our results raise the question of 
institutional fit in diverse landscapes with many other ungulate species: 
landscape diversity and an abundance of other ungulates both had 
negative effects on the performance of the moose policy. It thus seems 
that there is a need for adaptation to create institutions that better 
match the challenges of local contexts in order to secure positive social 
and ecological outcomes. 
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